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Abstract 
The sexual exploitation of children is detrimental to the physical and emotional 
health and development of the children and undermines the development and growth of 
nations. Since 1989 the international community has taken serious legislative steps to 
attempt to eliminate child sex trafficking. However, despite nearly universal ratification 
of international conventions on the topic, the sexual exploitation of children continues. 
The literature that addresses regime compliance suggests two general explanations for 
the lack of follow-through among signatory countries: a lack of capacity (both political 
and economic) and cultural proximity. This paper will examine the validity of each of 
these categories through analysis of data across sixty-seven countries drawn from 
diverse regions. This study finds that political capacity, followed by economic capacity, 
better accounts for compliance with child sex trafficking conventions than measures of 
cultural proximity. 
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That children require special protection has long been recognized. This unique 
need was first internationally acknowledged in 1924 with the Geneva Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, which “egulates[es] that mankind owes to the Child the best that it 
has to give…and must [protect the Child] against every form of exploitation” (1924).6 
Since then many international conventions have recognized that the vulnerability and 
impressionability of childhood create a special need, and have created specific legislation 
to address it. The relevant legislation includes the 1924 League of Nations Geneva 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the 1948 United Nations (UN) Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the 
1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from the same year.7 In the area of 
sexual exploitation of children the most notable of these conventions are the UN 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1999 International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention), and the 2002 
UN Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography. Each of these three conventions includes specific 
prohibitions against sexual exploitation and abuse with regard to prostitution, sex 
trafficking and sex tourism. However, despite the nearly universal ratification of each of 
these conventions, little is being done to improve the horrendous conditions in many of 
the ratifying countries.  
                                                 
6
 See Appendix A for definitions.  
7
 See Appendix B for more details. 
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Children around the world are being used in ways that no adult should ever 
tolerate. Because of the illegal and generally taboo nature of the subject there are few 
reliable statistics that can give specific numbers of children being sexually exploited. 
However, stories such as that of Nayla from Azerbaijan keep emerging.8  
Azerbaijan/UAE: After her father died when she was 9, Nayla was given 
to an orphanage. But her mother took her from the orphanage and sold her 
to traffickers who brought her to Dubai. She was prostituted in clubs in 
Dubai until she was 13 years old. After the Dubai police discovered her 
illegal status, Nayla was deported back to Azerbaijan. Once she returned 
to Azerbaijan, she was prostituted for three more years before becoming 
pregnant. She contracted AIDS either in Dubai or in Baku and gave birth 
to an HIV-positive baby last year. (Trafficking in Persons Report 2006) 
 
This story is just one of many. Each of these exploited children have their childhood, 
their freedom and their chance at life taken away from them. Many are left with sexually 
transmitted diseases, including AIDS, as Nayla was. This is a national and a transnational 
issue which needs to be universally addressed to be effectively halted. Children are often 
taken across borders to where regulation of prostitution is less strict, or to countries that 
are known sex tourism destinations. Nayla’s story demonstrates the lack of effective 
treatment that these countries’ justice systems give the issue. Instead of Nayla’s 
traffickers being brought to justice when her illegal status in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) was discovered, Nayla was simply deported and returned to Azerbaijan where her 
exploitation continued.9 This aspect of her story is by no means unique. Many of the 
countries with a high incidence of child exploitation actually prosecute or deport the 
children who are being exploited. This does nothing to reduce the problem but rather 
                                                 
8
 Name changed by the Trafficking in Persons Report 2006. 
9
 Azerbaijan has ratified all three of the relevant conventions and UAE has ratified both 
the 1999 ILO Convention and the 1989 UN Convention. 
48   Res Publica 
 
 
exacerbates it, as the traffickers will simply find and bring in a new child while the one 
deported, who has known only exploitation and has had no opportunity to improve his or 
her life, will have nothing to turn to but back to what they know.  
Many countries say on paper that they agree the problem is outrageous and 
promise to take steps to halt this exploitation, but then do little or nothing. This paper will 
attempt to explain differences in the level of compliance with child exploitation 
conventions cross-nationally. It will begin by examining the general literature on regime 
compliance and then draw hypotheses relevant to noncompliance with international child 
sex trafficking conventions. These hypotheses will then be tested with data drawn from 
international values surveys, fact books, and non-profit organizations. These results will 
then be analyzed and conclusions drawn as to what can explain this worrying lack of 
compliance and what might be done to improve compliance in the future.  
Explaining Compliance 
 
 Much of the literature on compliance tends to be sociological in nature. It 
generally focuses on varying theories regarding how to enforce compliance (Dai 2005; 
Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Hirsch 2005; Hurd 1999; May 2004; Neubauer and Kastner 
1969; Pollis 1996; Renteln 1988 and 2005; Tallberg 2002). These studies have broken 
compliance theory down into two main debates; the realist-liberal debate and the 
management-enforcement debate. The realist-liberal debate stems from the neorealist 
school of thought, which purports that compliance is best secured through coercion, 
versus the rationalist-neoliberal school of thought, which believes that compliance is 
secured through the self-interest of the participant. Both schools are based on the 
acknowledged concept that there are three well-established methods of social control 
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which each stem from one of three general reasons why a player might comply with a law 
or standard; (1) coercion stemming from a fear of the punishment inflicted upon 
disobedience, (2) self-interest stemming from a belief that compliance will benefit ones 
self and (3) legitimacy which stems from a belief that the law or standard is legitimate 
and therefore should be obeyed on its own merits (Hurd 1999).  
The management-enforcement debate, on the other hand approaches the 
explanation of compliance from a prevention versus remediation angle. The management 
school insists that a problem-solving technique which focuses on remedying  problems—
such as lack of capacity, differing or mistaken interpretations of  laws/standards, and 
greater governmental transparency—which aggravate noncompliance is the most 
successful means. 
 While this paper addresses the issue of why countries do not comply with 
international regimes rather than how to obtain greater compliance, this sociological 
literature can still point toward a couple of general approaches to the relevant question. 
Within this literature are hints—often only implied by the suggested solutions to the lack 
of compliance problem—at what factors cause countries to comply (or not) with 
international conventions. Peter May, for example, suggests;  
Compliance with regulations is far from automatic for a variety of 
reasons…egulates may not know about regulatory requirements, may 
not agree with them, may not be capable of complying with them, may 
find it too costly to comply, or simply may not care (1999). 
 
 These ideas break down into two general approaches: capacity and cultural proximity.  
The Capacity Approach 
 Springing from the management-enforcement debate comes the idea that it is 
because of a lack of political and/or economic capacity that these problem countries are 
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not able to comply with the international conventions they say they support. Proponents 
of the management school believe that states have every intention of complying with 
international regimes to which they sign on, but it is because of “political and economic 
capacity limitations” (Tallberg 2002, 613) that they do not comply.  
This idea is reinforced in the general literature about the problem of sex 
trafficking and exploitation. Factors such as “poverty, the attraction of perceived higher 
standards of living elsewhere, lack of employment opportunities, organized 
crime…government corruption [and] political instability” (Trafficking in Persons Report 
2006) are commonly mentioned in these sources. These factors are indicative of such 
capacity failures as are mentioned by the sociological authors.  
Not only do these factors further noncompliance at a governmental level, but they 
further the problem of trafficking itself, which then makes it even more difficult for these 
governments to comply. An often cited example of this will be referred to as the “golden 
opportunity principle”. This expresses the idea that the situation, often economic, in these 
noncompliant countries is so unbearable that “many of the…victims view [their 
trafficker] as a savior rather than a trafficker of human lives” (Renteln 2005, 61).  Often, 
the literature points out, sexually exploitive acts are not actually a culturally desired or 
even accepted practice but are only viewed as such because of the frequency with which 
a blind eye is turned. This, rather than reflecting the culture of the country, reflects the 
exceedingly harsh conditions in which these people live their lives. These suffering 
people sometimes see these exploitative actions as a way of bringing money and through 
to relieve themselves and their fellow countrymen.  As Renteln says; “sex slavery and 
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forced labor, are not valued cultural traditions, but reflect the desperation on the part of 
families” (2005).  
The literature also proposes a factor of pride associated with capacity limitations. 
It has been suggested that governments will “resist international supervision and are 
reluctant to implement recommendations and views” (Heyns and Viljoen 2001, 517) 
because they are jealous of their sovereignty. This issue is further exacerbated when the 
international culture is at odds with local traditions and practices. The general literatures 
also cite many sources which are cultural in nature as contributing factors to 
incompliance. This leads to the second approach that is hinted at in the sociological 
literature; the cultural proximity approach. 
The Cultural Proximity Approach 
 Cultural relativism is now being emphasized as extremely important to the 
understanding of compliance motivations (Fellmeth 2000; Pollis 1996; Renteln 1988 and 
2005). Preference as a reason for noncompliance has been said often to be caused by a 
lack of connection to the ideals supported by the international regime. When compliance 
with the international regime requires major changes in either/both beliefs or behaviors, 
there is less likelihood that a country will comply. In other words, the countries whose 
belief structures and actions begin at the farthest point from those pushed by international 
regimes will remain the most distant because these countries have farther to go and less 
incentive to do so. This idea is reflected in the “depth-of-cooperation hypothesis” 
discussed by Tallberg. This hypothesis theorizes that noncompliance rises with the degree 
of behavioral and legal change required to attain compliance. Therefore, “varying 
adjustment pressures…translate into varying degrees of compliance” (2002). This 
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supports the idea that international legislation—such as that addressing child sexual 
exploitation—likely will not impact its target countries, because the behavioral and legal 
changes required would be much greater than in those already close to compliance.  
 Often these conflicting traditional practices are not seen as harmful and are even, 
in some cultures or contexts, considered beneficial. For example, child marriage is often 
thought to give the child a better life while alleviating some of the financial burden on 
their family. These children are often given away with only their best interests in their 
parents and communities’ hearts. However, “violence, exploitation, and abuse may be 
tolerated or encouraged in the form of child marriage” (Landgren 2005, 232). These 
awful results are often not seen in communities from which the child has been taken since 
often the child has no way to communicate with their family. Because of this, many of 
the local communities do not know how dangerous and detrimental the practice can be. 
The fostering of children—sending children from their family to work for a wealthier 
family in exchange for an education—is a similar practice and situation. Often the child 
is forced to work as a slave with none of the promised education given to them. Both of 
these practices, besides being injurious to a protective environment for children in and of 
themselves, also open the door for sex traffickers to easily steal children by simply 
posing as marriage prospects or a potential family (Trafficking in Persons Report 2006). 
Often practices that are intended to uphold cultural values are some of the most 
formidable challenges to compliance.  
Combination 
 Many specific factors that are suggested throughout the various literatures draw 
from both of these approaches. For example, public knowledge and discussion has been 
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suggested by several authors (Landgren 2005; Harris-Short 2003; Heyns and Viljoen 
2001) as a key factor influencing compliance. This public knowledge and public 
discussion, however, draws its source not from either of the singular approaches but from 
both. Culturally, these “issues which permeate child protection [such as sex and 
violence], are frequently taboo for public and even private discussion” (Landgren 2005, 
223). The public feels more comfortable simply ignoring the problem and hoping it will 
go away, which of course it will not until it is actively addressed. The public is not alone 
in holding blame for lack of discussion, though. The government, either because of 
embarrassment—related to the capacity issue of pride that was discussed earlier—or 
because of economic gains for the country, or even simply because of personal greed and 
corruption, ignores the problem as well.10 In addition to their ignorance, they keep the 
public in the dark by refusing to disseminate this important information which could fuel 
public discussion and through it change in the way children are protected. Even when the 
national government does pass legislation meant to protect children it backfires because 
the government refuses to broach the subject in the public discourse. As Landgren states; 
“Legislation passed in isolation from a national debate and broader engagement can push 
practices underground, as well as generating backlash” (2005).  
 This example of public discussion is just one of many factors which offer 
explanation through both capacity and proximity approaches. Not only are single factors 
often explained by both approaches, but it is nearly universal in the non-sociology based 
literature that a combination of factors are cited when reasons for noncompliance are 
                                                 
10
 “Protection abuses, or more precisely their public airing, can be felt as nationally 
humiliating and their official acknowledgement may be slow in coming” (Landgren 2005, 
228). 
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discussed. The sociological literature would likely agree that it is a combination of factors 
that can explain noncompliance. However, it is from this sociological literature that 
separate approaches are laid out. This paper will use the two approaches given by 
sociology, and break them into individual specific factors suggested by the literature on 
sex trafficking within these categories.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on the approach the literature takes, it is logical to break the hypotheses 
into three sections. The political capacity section will address predictions regarding how 
the political capacity of a nation will affect its compliance with international conventions 
regulating child sex trafficking. The economic capacity section will do the same, looking 
at economic factors. The cultural proximity section will attempt to measure attitudes and 
see how these various factors play into compliance. The following three sections will lay 
out what exactly are the hypotheses tested in this paper. 
Political Capacity 
The political capacity hypotheses contain a single general hypothesis followed by 
two more specific hypotheses, the confirmation of which would show the confirmation of 
the general hypothesis. The general hypothesis is based on the logical conclusions drawn 
from the literature and can be related as follows: 
H1: The level of government compliance with international conventions 
on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is positively correlated with 
high political capacity of the government. 
 
This general hypothesis leads to implied hypothesis, H1.1, which addresses corruption, a 
widely recognized key factor affecting political capacity. It seems obvious that the more 
corrupt a nation’s government, the lower the political capacity of the country and 
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therefore, based on H1, the less compliant with international regimes on child sex 
trafficking. Therefore, H1.1 can be summarized as the following: 
H1.1: Level of corruption in the national government is negatively 
correlated with the level of government compliance with international regulations 
on sexual exploitation of children. 
 
The second more specific hypothesis, H1.2, deals with the legitimacy of the 
governments of these various nations. It, like the previous, is drawn from a seemingly 
logical assumption, in this case that the more legitimate a government, the more 
compliant it will be with international regimes. This hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H1.2: Increases in the legitimacy of the national government will be 
positively correlated with increases in the level of government compliance with 
international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children.  
 
Economic Capacity 
The economic capacity hypotheses are in much the same format as the political 
capacity section, but include three more specific hypotheses which attempt to address the 
general hypothesis rather than only two. In this section the general hypothesis is: 
H2: The level of government compliance with international conventions 
on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is positively correlated with 
high economic capacity of the country. 
 
This hypothesis is drawn from theorizing that countries with lower economic capacity 
will have more motivation to ignore signs of child sex trafficking because they need the 
income that can be brought in by such trade. The first more specific hypothesis, H2.1, 
specifically looks at this theory through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita of 
each case country. GDP – per capita is an effective measure of economic capacity, as it 
directly reflects the amount of money that a country has. H2.1 is based on the same 
reasoning as the general economic capacity hypothesis, and is stated as follows: 
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H2.1: The GDP – per capita (PPP) will positively correlate with the level 
of compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of children. 
 
The second more specific hypothesis, H2.2, takes this same reasoning again but 
this time uses the unemployment rate of the nation as a measure of economic capacity. 
This is justified as a proper measure based on how the opinion of the public can influence 
government compliance, especially when a government is legitimate. While GDP works 
to measure motivation of the national government to comply, unemployment rate can 
measure motivation of the general public to accept the exploitation of children when they 
otherwise would not. When many people cannot get legitimate legal employment, they 
will be more likely to engage in illegal practices to bring in income, such as child sex 
trafficking. Because of this reasoning, H2.2, is as follows: 
H2.2: Increases in the unemployment rate will negatively correlate with the 
level of compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of children. 
 
The final specific economic capacity hypothesis addresses the same issue and 
uses the same reasoning as H2.2. The percent of the population living below the poverty 
line is used instead of the unemployment rate, but can arguably be used as a very similar 
measure. Therefore, H2.3 is very similar to H2.2 and is stated as follows: 
H2.3: The greater the percentage of the population below the poverty line, 
the less a country will be compliant with the international conventions on the 
sexual exploitation and trafficking of children. 
 
While both these final two hypotheses are being used mainly to examine the motivations 
of the general public, it must be kept in mind that both also encompass the economic 
motivations of the government. This is because the economic interests of the population 
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often coincide with those of the government, since everyone is relatively better off with 
more money flowing through the country. 
Cultural Proximity 
 The general cultural proximity hypothesis stems from the idea that the more 
culturally congruent a nation’s traditions and values are with the presiding, and arguably 
western, international regime the easier it is for the country to comply. Therefore, this 
general hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: The traditions and cultural attitudes of the people toward factors 
related to sexual exploitation of children influence government compliance with 
international regulations more than the international views expressed in these 
regulations. 
 
The first of the three more specific hypotheses deals with the liberality of national 
attitudes toward issues such as gender equality and sexuality. Since most of those 
exploited are girl children, it is believed that a more liberal view of female empowerment 
would positively correlate with a stricter view on the sexual exploitation of children. As 
for sexuality, the more liberal the general attitude toward sexual freedom, the more likely 
it is that there will be an active discussion of the issues surrounding sex trafficking, and 
with discussion come solutions and action. This hypothesis stems from the basic idea that 
the more open a people and government are, the more responsive the government will be 
to human rights violations such as child sex trafficking. Because of the previous 
reasoning H3.1 proposes the following: 
H3.1: Countries with more liberal attitudes toward female empowerment 
and sexuality will be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual 
exploitation of children. 
 
The second specific hypothesis is very similar to the first, but instead deals with 
how conservative the nation’s attitude is toward prostitution. The logic is that the less 
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approval there is of prostitution, the more likely the public would be to support 
legislation minimizing prostitution and through it the sexual exploitation of children. This 
leads to H3.2 which is: 
H3.2: Countries with more conservative attitudes toward prostitution will 
be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual exploitation of 
children. 
 
The final specific hypothesis deals with the value a country places on female 
children. The logic behind this hypothesis is the same as that of female empowerment in 
H3.1. Because girl children are more often exploited and trafficked, it seems overtly 
logical that the less a country values these little girls, the less they will be protected and 
the harder this attitude will be to change, and it must be changed for the relevant 
legislation to be enforced. Because of this reasoning, H3.3 is as follows: 
H3.3: Countries which place little value on female children will be less 
compliant with international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children. 
 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 The research reported in this paper follows a comparative cross-national research 
design involving sixty-seven cases from around the world. The data used to test the 
hypotheses were gathered from a variety of statistical and/or academic sources which 
were analyzed to draw conclusions on the previously stated hypotheses. 
Case Selection 
 To identify the factors that account for varying levels of compliance with 
international conventions on the sexual exploitation of children, it is necessary to include 
cases from different geographical regions, levels of socio-economic development and 
cultures. Further criteria for inclusion consist of: (1) the country must have ratified the 
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three key conventions that deal with the sex trafficking of children (the 1998 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol added to the previous Act in 
2000, and the 1999 ILO Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention); (2) 
the country must be identified as a democratic state by the CIA World Factbook; (3) each 
case must  have/had at least some direct experience with child sex trafficking as reported 
in the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) which requires that 
included countries be “… determined to be countries of origin, transit, or destination for a 
significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking” (2006); and finally (4) there 
has to be available and comparable data across the range of variables. After going 
through the list of possible cases and cutting those that did not meet the criteria, sixty 
seven cases were left.11 
Dependent Variable: Compliance 
 The dependent variable in this study is the compliance of a country with 
international conventions regarding the sexual trafficking and exploitation of children. 
This variable is measured through the recoding of a three tier system from TIP. TIP 
reports from 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 were used. The TIP does not base 
its ratings on compliance with the three international conventions this paper examines; 
rather it uses a U.S. Public Law called the Trafficking in Victims Protection Act of 2000 
                                                 
11
 See Appendix D for a complete regional list. 
Africa Asia
Central 
America
Eastern 
Europe
South 
America
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Western 
Europe
Number of 
cases 4 11 8 13 9 15 7
Table 1 - Regions
60   Res Publica 
 
 
(TVPA).12 Section 108 of this Act lays out specific “Minimum Standards for the 
Elimination of Trafficking” which are what the TIP uses as its measure of compliance.13 
The minimum standards are directly comparable with the requirements of the three major 
conventions on child sex trafficking; therefore it serves as a valid measure .  
 The TIP bases its tier placement on the following criteria: 
1) The extent to which the county is a country of origin, transit, or 
destination for severe forms of trafficking; 2) The extent to which the 
government of the country does not comply with the TVPA’s 
minimum standards and, in particular the extent of the government’s 
trafficking related corruption; and 3) The resources and capabilities of 
the government to address and eliminate severe forms of trafficking in 
persons. 
 
While the third criterion may, at first glance, seem to be the same as economic capacity 
or political capacity, this is not the case. While the variables used in this study use direct 
measures of corruption, legitimacy, GDP, rate below the poverty line and unemployment 
to test these capacity issues, none of these are even mentioned in the individual country 
narratives which the TIP says “explains the basis for rating a country as Tier 1, Tier 2, 
Tier 2 Watch List, or Tier 3” (2006). Rather, when the TIP references resources and 
capabilities, it speaks only of what resources the government has dedicated to the fight 
against the sex trafficking of children and what resources they should dedicate. Because 
of this it is not felt that this criterion conflicts with either category of hypotheses.  
 From the tier placement criteria, the countries the TIP addresses are broken into 
four categories: Tier 1 includes countries which comply fully with the minimum 
standards of the TVPA; Tier 2 countries’ governments do not yet fully comply with the 
                                                 
12
 Pub. L. No. 106-386. 
13
 See Appendix C for complete Minimum Standards directly from the TIP 2006. 
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Graph 1 - Compliance Distribution
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TVPA minimum standards but have been making “significant efforts” (31) (emphasis 
added) to comply fully; Tier 2 Special Watch List (Tier 2W) includes countries which 
would fall into the criteria for Tier 2 but about which the TIP has concerns based on a) 
the increasing level of trafficking, b) lack of evidence of increasing effort to combat 
trafficking, and/or c) future commitments to further steps are the only real basis for 
placement in Tier 2 in the first place; Tier 3 is the final category and includes countries 
whose governments do not fully comply with TVPA Minimum Standards and are making 
insignificant, if any, efforts to bring themselves into compliance. It is worth noting that 
these tiers were not determined based solely on the self-reporting of a country. Because 
of issues of exaggeration or flat-out lying, the TIP put little weight on the statements of 
the governments, but rather focuses on “the concrete actions governments have taken to 
fight trafficking, especially prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences for 
traffickers, victim protection, and prevention efforts” (2006). The report does not take 
indirect efforts—such as education programs—into account when making these tier 
placements, though the report does acknowledge the benefit such programs can have.  
 For use as a measurement device in this paper, these tiers were recoded into a six-
point scale. A country was given the ranking of 
6 if it had been consistently ranked Tier 1 by the 
TIP or had moved up to Tier 1 from a lower 
tier.14 A country was considered a 5 if it had 
risen in rank to Tier 2 from a lower rank and 
was considered a 4 if it had been pretty 
                                                 
14
 See Appendix E for Tables of the distribution for each variable. 
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consistently Tier 2. A country was coded a 3 if it had dropped to Tier 2 from Tier 1 or if 
it had risen to Tier 2W from Tier 3. A coding of 2 represents a country which has 
dropped to Tier 2W from a higher tier or the country has been almost consistently Tier 
2W. The lowest number, 1, was awarded to countries that have been consistently Tier 3 
or have dropped to Tier 3 from any of the higher categories.  
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables included in this study were broken down into the same 
three categories as the hypotheses: 1) political capacity, 2) economic capacity and 3) 
cultural proximity.  
Political Capacity Variables  
 The political capacity factors include corruption and legitimacy. These capture the 
greatest problems affecting political capacity and therefore accurately measure the effect 
this approach has on compliance. Corruption is measured with the rankings from the 
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, a self 
described “global civil society organization” (Tranparency.org). The CPI is created based 
on assessments made by experts in the field and by opinion surveys done in each of the 
countries which are used to self-assess the problem. The CPI scale ranges from 10 
representing no corruption and 1 representing extreme corruption, these numbers were 
then coded directly into the dataset used in this study. 
 The measure of legitimacy came from the 2006“Freedom in the World” ratings by 
Freedom House, a widely recognized expert on freedom in countries around the world 
which produces this “annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights and 
civil liberties in 192 countries and 14 related and disputed territories” 
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(freedomhouse.org).15   Freedom House gives each country a rating of “Free”, “Partially 
Free” or “Not Free”. For the purposes of this study these numbers were coded so that any 
country rated by Freedom House as “Free” was coded as 3, a ranking of “Partially Free” 
was given a 2, and those that were said to be “Not Free” were given a 1. 
Economic Capacity Variables  
 Economic capacity variables are also meant to capture the capacity of the 
government, though this time in the economic arena. These variables include GDP-Per 
Capita (PPP), the percent of the population living below the poverty line and the 
unemployment rate. These measures effectively capture economic capacity, as a 
government with higher economic capacity would be better able to provide for their 
citizens, which would lower both the unemployment rate and the rate of people below the 
poverty line. It is also assumed that the higher the GDP-Per Capita, the higher the 
economic capacity of the country.  
 Each of these three variables are measured with numbers taken from the 2006 
version of The World Factbook created by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). GDP – 
Per Capita (PPP) shows the GDP divided by the population (in the 2006 World Factbook 
this number is taken as of July 1, 2006)  thereby showing the GDP per person at the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) level, which means at the prevailing United States (US) 
dollar exchange. The number was taken from the World Factbook and divided by 1000 
and then coded into the dataset of this study.  
 The unemployment rate represents the percentage of the labor force—typically, 
those of working age who are seeking employment—that are not employed. The 
                                                 
15
 Chad and Costa Rica are exceptions to this. The numbers to measure these two 
countries came from the 2005 ratings as the 2006 numbers were not available. 
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percentage of people living below the poverty line is estimated through “surveys of sub-
groups, with the results weighted by the number of people in each group” (cia.gov). The 
poverty line itself fluctuates from country to country, as richer nations typically use 
“more generous standards of poverty than poor nations” (cia.gov). The measures of 
population below the poverty line and unemployment rate with both given in percentages 
so these numbers were coded directly into the dataset. 
Cultural Proximity Variables 
 The final category is cultural factors. In this study, culture is measured by 
attitudes of the public towards prostitution, underage sex, female empowerment and girl 
children. The gender attitudes are included because the great majority of those trafficked 
are female, and especially girl children. These specific attitudinal variables are felt to 
encompass traditional values which will likely differ from country to country, though 
more especially from region to region. The selected variables are those which will likely 
have a direct impact on how the public of a country view the issue of sex trafficking and 
other sexual exploitation of children. 
 The level of female empowerment in this study is measured with the Human 
Development Reports’ 2005 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). This measure is 
created by “measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment—
economic participation and decision-making, political participation, and decision-making 
and power over economic resources” (hdr.undp.org). The GEM uses four measures to 
capture these dimensions: seats held by women in parliament; female legislators, senior 
officials and managers; female professional and technical workers; and the female to 
male ratio of estimated earned income. The GEM gives countries a value of 0 to 1; the 
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closer the value is to 1 the more empowered the women of that country are said to be. 
The number assigned to each country was then directly coded into the dataset for this 
study. 
 The attitudes toward prostitution, underage sex, sexual freedom and girl children 
were all measured with questions from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the 
European Values Surveys (EVS) from 1981-2004, a dataset that combines seven total 
surveys. From this dataset, this survey used four individual questions. The first, question 
D024, measures attitudes toward sexual freedom; “If someone said that individuals 
should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would 
you tend to agree or disagree?” After running frequencies for each case on SPSS, the 
valid percent of respondents that answered “disagree” was coded directly into this study’s 
dataset. The next question, D025, was used to measure attitudes toward girl children: “If 
you were to have only one child, would you rather have it be a boy or a girl?” SPSS 
frequencies were again run, and this time the valid percentage that answered that they 
would prefer a boy child was entered.  
 The questions measuring attitudes toward prostitution and underage sex, F119 and 
F135 respectively, were the same question with only the active phrase being different. 
Specifically the question read: “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in between”. 
“Prostitution” and “sex under the legal age of consent” were two of the statements. For 
both of these questions, SPSS was run and the valid percent that answered “Never 
Justifiable” was entered into this study’s dataset. 
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Findings and Analysis 
 This section will report and analyze the results uncovered through empirical 
analysis. Bivariate correlations were run to test the strength and directionality of the 
relationship between each independent variable (corruption, legitimacy, GDP-Per Capita 
(PPP), percent below the poverty line, unemployment rate, female empowerment, sexual 
freedom, value placed on boy children, justifiability of prostitution, and justifiability of 
underage sex) and the dependent variable (compliance). These tests also determined the 
statistical reliability of each finding. The results found that, in general, the directionality 
of the results was consistent with the proposed hypotheses. There were, however, some 
exceptions that went opposite to the direction predicted. These exceptions will be 
discussed in detail under the section in which they arise.  
Political Capacity 
 The political capacity factors proved to be the most statistically significant 
grouping as well as the pair with the strongest correlations. Corruption was extremely 
significant (as can be seen in Table 2) and also held the strongest relationship of any 
results at 0.335. 
Since the measure 
of corruption used 
in the Corruption Perceptions Index approaches 10 as corruption decreases, and the 
measure of compliance created for this study approaches 6 as compliance rises, a positive 
correlation would be the expected result of the bivariate testing. Therefore, this finding of 
0.335 confirms H1.1, that as corruption rises, the level of government compliance with 
international regulations on sexual exploitation of children decreases.  
Table 2 – Political Capacity Results
Expected 
Direction
Correlation 
Coefficient
Significance 
(1-tailed) N
Corruption positive 0.335* 0.003* 66
Legitimacy positive 0.208* 0.046* 67
** = significant at the .01 level                   * = significant at the .05 level
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Legitimacy was not far behind corruption with statistical significance at the .05 
level and a relatively strong correlation of 0.208. Again, this correlation is in the expected 
direction, as the Freedom House legitimacy rankings were coded, in this study, from 3 
representing a rating of “Free” to 1 representing a ranking of “Not Free”. This finding 
then confirms H1.2, that  increases in the legitimacy of the national government will be 
positively correlated with increases in the level of government compliance with 
international regulations on the sexual exploitation of children.  
With both of these hypotheses confirmed, it is easy to determine that the general 
hypothesis regarding political capacity—H1: The level of government compliance with 
international conventions on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is 
positively correlated with high political capacity of the government—is confirmed. This 
affirmation, in turn, demonstrates, part of what the literature has theorized. The 
comparative strength and reliability of this result emphasizes the importance that political 
factors play in the level of compliance a country maintains. 
Economic Capacity 
The economic capacity hypotheses were also confirmed, but in general were less 
robust and less reliable than the political capacity. The failing statistical significance of 
these tests is 
likely because 
of the reduced 
N, a problem 
that will plague 
this study even more during the attitudinal tests. As can be seen in Table 3, when the N is 
Expected 
Direction
Correlation 
Coefficient
Significance 
(1-tailed) N
GDP - Per 
Capita (PPP) positive 0.277 0.012 66
Unemployment 
Rate negative -0.145 0.142 56
Percent Below 
Poverty Line negative -0.123 0.189 54
** = significant at the .01 level                   * = significant at the .05 level
Table 3 - Economic Capacity Results
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reduced, even only by 10 cases, the statistical significance significantly worsens. 
However, the statistical significance is not so bad that indications of results cannot still be 
claimed. 
As seen in Table 3, the results for GDP – Per Capita (PPP) are statistically 
significant reaching almost the 0.01 level. This, partnered with a correlation of 0.277 
confirms H2.1, that GDP – per capita (PPP) will positively correlate with the level of 
compliance. Unemployment rate and poverty line are much shakier but do suggest 
confirmations of the hypotheses H2.2 and H2.3. While neither is statistically significant or 
has particularly strong directionality, both do run in the expected negative direction. It 
was expected that these variables would both show a negative relationship to compliance 
because rises in both the percentage of people living below the poverty line and of 
persons unemployed represent increased poverty. It seems logical that the poorer the 
people of a country are, the more likely they would be to allow for any income 
possible—and unfortunately sexually exploiting children can bring income into a 
country—which would mean less compliance with international regulations on these 
possible incomes. 
Overall, this study finds that the general hypotheses—H2: The level of 
government compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of children is positively correlated with high economic capacity of the 
country—regarding economic factors is confirmed. This also confirms what the literature 
suggests and leads to the examination of the final aspect that the literature suggests would 
affect compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of children, cultural proximity factors. 
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Cultural Proximity 
 The tests of cultural proximity provided, by far, the least statistically significant 
results. This, as stated earlier, is likely because the N for these tests is so significantly 
lower. Little 
attitudinal data were 
available for these 
countries from 
many international 
surveys examined. 
However, even 
these insignificant results can generally suggest the directionality of the relationship 
between the variables. The exception to this is the measure of sexual freedom.  
 The relationship between the value of sexual freedom and compliance came back 
at -0.032. While against the expected direction, the weakness of this correlation was not 
surprising. It was difficult to determine whether this variable should be expected to have 
a negative or positive relationship with compliance in the first place. This is because 
either direction could be justified, which likely explains at least in part why the 
relationship is so weak. To justify an expected positive direction, it must be believed that 
a country with more sexual freedom would be more open to discussion of the topic of 
child sexual exploitation. Through discussion, it has been widely recognized, come 
solutions. Therefore, because of the openness of sexuality, solutions to the tragic problem 
of exploitation can be formed. On the other hand, it could be argued that countries more 
accepting of deviant sexual behavior would be more accepting of sex with children and 
Expected 
Direction
Correlation 
Coefficient
Significance 
(1-tailed) N
Gender 
Empowerment positive 0.268 0.055 37
Value Sexual 
Freedom positive -0.032 0.43 34
Value Boy 
Children negative -0.313 0.053 28
 Prostitution 
Never Justified positive -0.238 0.072 39
Underage Sex 
Never Justified positive 0.199 0.187 22
Table 4 - Cultural Proximity Results
** = significant at the .01 level                   * = significant at the .05 level
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because of this, of exploitation. This leads to the variable of justifiability of sexual 
relations under the age of consent, which actually turns out to suggest disproval of this 
theory, by showing that where it is felt that sex under the age of consent is never justified, 
there is greater compliance with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of children.  
 As seen in Table 4, the measure of approval of underage sex came back with a 
relationship of 0.199 and a statistical significance of 0.187. While this is not extremely 
reliable, it suggests a relationship that would likely be confirmed if the N could be raised 
above the very low number of 22. This relationship was in the expected direction, which 
was not surprising. It seems fundamentally logical that countries in which the people 
approve less of underage sex will be more stringent with the regulation of underage sex, 
and through regulation, more compliant with the conventions on the sexual exploitation 
and trafficking of children. The other expectation that seemed fundamentally logical, 
however, went in the completely unexpected direction. This was the measure of attitudes 
toward prostitution. 
 It was expected that countries in which the people approved less of prostitution 
would be more compliant with the relevant international conventions. This was assumed 
simply because the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is linked so 
fundamentally with prostitution. However, though a positive relationship was expected, 
the results returned a correlation of -0.238 with a reliability of 0.072. While not 
technically significant, it is quite close to being significant at the 0.05 level, and 
regardless of the significance, it is an arguably strong relationship. This finding was 
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extremely surprising and no reasons for it jump to mind. Therefore, it is felt that this 
variable requires further study to try to explain this result. 
 The final two cultural proximity variables—value on male children and gender 
empowerment—both fell in the expected directions and had a statistical significance of 
0.053 and 0.055 respectively. They both had very strong relationships with compliance, 
with the value of male children bringing in the second strongest number with -0.313 and 
gender empowerment coming in fourth with 0.268. It was believed that the value placed 
on male children would be negatively correlated with compliance, since girls are much 
more often sexually exploited. Conversely, it was expected that female empowerment 
would positively correlate with compliance. 
 Overall, it appears that the general hypothesis—H3: The traditions and cultural 
attitudes of the people toward factors related to sexual exploitation of children influence 
government compliance with international regulations more than the international views 
expressed in these regulations—regarding cultural proximity as a factor was confirmed, 
even though H3.2—that countries with more conservative attitudes toward prostitution 
will be more compliant with international conventions on the sexual exploitation of 
children—was apparently refuted.  
Conclusions 
 My original research question addressed what factors affected the compliance of a 
country with international conventions on the sexual exploitation and trafficking of 
children. The literature suggested that political and economic capacity and cultural 
proximity of the nation played a role. The results reported in this paper seem to confirm 
these suggestions. However, some results were weak, insignificant or surprising. This 
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opens the door for future research examining cases that may be exceptions to the general 
rule. It would be interesting to research these specific cases in more detail, and perhaps 
uncover why these exceptions occur. There is also, of course, the ever-present hope that 
previously unfound data will appear and make the already tested variables have more 
reliable results. In addition, there are more factors—such as the practice of child 
fostering, child labor standards of the individual countries, and the amount of public 
discussion and the availability of information on this topic individual level—that these 
results suggest may also figure in to compliance. These questions will, it is hoped, be 
answered with further research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Definitions 
 - Child: Defined in the legislation as either 1) under 18 years of age or 2) pre-pubescent. 
This study defines a child anyone under 18 years of age, as do the three international 
conventions this study focuses on.  
- Sex Trafficking: “The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of 
a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act” (TIP 2006). 
- Child Prostitution: “The use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any 
other form of consideration” (Optional Protocol 2000).   
Appendix B: The Conventions 
 
- Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the League of 
Nations September 26, 1924.  
 -  Principle 4: “The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and 
must be protected against every form of exploitation”  
 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Adopted by the UN December 10, 
1948. 
-  Article 25 Section 2: “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special 
care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection.” 
 
 -  Declaration of the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the UN November 20, 1959. 
-  Preamble: “The child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, 
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection.” 
-  Principle 2: “The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given 
opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to 
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy 
and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the 
enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be 
the paramount consideration.” 
-  Principle 9: “The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, 
cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form. 
The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate 
minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any 
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occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education, 
or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development.” 
-  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Adopted by 
the UN on December 16, 1966. 
- Article 10 Section 3: “Special measures of protection and assistance 
should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any 
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and 
young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. 
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous 
to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable 
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment 
of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.” 
 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Adopted by the UN on 
March 23, 1976. 
- Article 24 Section 1: “Every child shall have, without any discrimination 
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, 
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required 
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.” 
 
- Convention on the Rights of the Child: Adopted by the UN on November 20, 
1989. 
 
- Article 11: “1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit 
transfer and non-return of children abroad. 2. To this end, States Parties 
shall promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
accession to existing agreements.” 
- Article 34: “States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties 
shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage 
in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative use of children in 
prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of 
children in pornographic performances and materials.”  
- Article 35: “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and 
multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in 
children for any purpose or in any form.” 
- Article 36: “States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of 
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare.” 
- Article 39: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote 
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child 
victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed 
conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an 
environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the 
child.” 
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- Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention: Adopted by the ILO on June 17, 
1999. 
- Article 3 Sections a, b and d: “For the purposes of this Convention, the 
term the worst forms of child labour comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, 
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including 
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) 
the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production 
of pornography or for pornographic performances; (d) work which, by its 
nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the 
health, safety or morals of children.” 
- Article 7 (especially Section e): “1. Each Member shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions giving effect to this Convention including the provision and 
application of penal sanctions or, as appropriate, other sanctions. 2. Each 
Member shall, taking into account the importance of education in 
eliminating child labour, take effective and time-bound measures to: (a) 
prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour; (b) 
provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal of 
children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation 
and social integration; (c) ensure access to free basic education, and, 
wherever possible and appropriate, vocational training, for all children 
removed from the worst forms of child labour; (d) identify and reach out 
to children at special risk; and (e) take account of the special situation of 
girls.” 
 
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography: Adopted by the UN on 
May 25, 2000.  
 
- Article 1: “States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography as provided for by the present 
Protocol.” 
- Article 2: “For the purposes of the present Protocol: (a) Sale of children 
means any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person 
or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other 
consideration; (b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in sexual 
activities for remuneration or any other form of consideration; (c) Child 
pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child 
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation 
of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.” 
- Article 3: “1. Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the 
following acts and activities are fully covered under its criminal or penal 
law, whether such offences are committed domestically or transnationally 
or on an individual or organized basis: (a) In the context of sale of children 
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as defined in article 2: (i) Offering, delivering or accepting, by whatever 
means, a child for the purpose of: a. Sexual exploitation of the child; b. 
Transfer of organs of the child for profit; c. Engagement of the child in 
forced labour; (ii) Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the 
adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal 
instruments on adoption; (b) Offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a 
child for child prostitution, as defined in article 2; (c) Producing, 
distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or 
possessing for the above purposes child pornography as defined in article 
2. 2. Subject to the provisions of the national law of a State Party, the 
same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the said acts and to 
complicity or participation in any of the said acts. 3. Each State Party shall 
make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties that take into 
account their grave nature. 4. Subject to the provisions of its national law, 
each State Party shall take measures, where appropriate, to establish the 
liability of legal persons for offences established in paragraph 1 of the 
present article. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, such 
liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. 5. States 
Parties shall take all appropriate legal and administrative measures to 
ensure that all persons involved in the adoption of a child act in 
conformity with applicable international legal instruments.” 
 
Appendix C: Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
 
“TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT —  MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Div. A of Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 108, as 
amended.  
(I) Minimum standards 
For purposes of this chapter, the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking 
applicable to the government of a country of origin, transit, or destination for a significant 
number of victims of severe forms of trafficking are the following:  
2. The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in 
persons and punish acts of such trafficking.  
3. For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, 
coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving 
meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which 
causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment 
commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault.  
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4. For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons, 
the government of the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently 
stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense.  
5. The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to 
eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.  
(B) Criteria  
In determinations under subsection (a)(4) of this section, the following factors should be 
considered as indicia of serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of 
trafficking in persons:  
1. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes 
acts of severe forms of trafficking in persons, and convicts and sentences persons 
responsible for such acts, that take place wholly or partly within the territory of 
the country. After reasonable requests from the Department of State for data 
regarding investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, a government, 
which does not provide such data, consistent with the capacity of such 
government to obtain such data, shall be presumed not to have vigorously 
investigated, prosecuted, convicted or sentenced such acts. During the periods 
prior to the annual report submitted on June 1, 2004, and on June 1, 2005, and the 
periods afterwards until September 30 of each such year, the Secretary of State 
may disregard the presumption contained in the preceding sentence if the 
government has provided some data to the Department of State regarding such 
acts and the Secretary has determined that the government is making a good faith 
effort to collect such data.  
2. Whether the government of the country protects victims of severe forms of 
trafficking in persons and encourages their assistance in the investigation and 
prosecution of such trafficking, including provisions for legal alternatives to their 
removal to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship, and 
ensures that victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise 
penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked. 
3. Whether the government of the country has adopted measures to prevent severe 
forms of trafficking in persons, such as measures to inform and educate the 
public, including potential victims, about the causes and consequences of severe 
forms of trafficking in persons. 
4. Whether the government of the country cooperates with other governments in the 
investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons. 
5. Whether the government of the country extradites persons charged with acts of 
severe forms of trafficking in persons on substantially the same terms and to 
substantially the same extent as persons charged with other serious crimes (or, to 
the extent such extradition would be inconsistent with the laws of such country or 
with international agreements to which the country is a party, whether the 
government is taking all appropriate measures to modify or replace such laws and 
treaties so as to permit such extradition). 
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6. Whether the government of the country monitors immigration and emigration 
patterns for evidence of severe forms of trafficking in persons and whether law 
enforcement agencies of the country respond to any such evidence in a manner 
that is consistent with the vigorous investigation and prosecution of acts of such 
trafficking, as well as with the protection of human rights of victims and the 
internationally recognized human right to leave any country, including one’s own, 
and to return to one’s own country. 
7. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates, prosecutes, 
convicts, and sentences public officials who participate in or facilitate severe 
forms of trafficking in persons, and takes all appropriate measures against 
officials who condone such trafficking. After reasonable requests from the 
Department of State for data regarding such investigations, prosecutions, 
convictions, and sentences, a government which does not provide such data 
consistent with its resources shall be presumed not to have vigorously 
investigated, prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced such acts. During the periods 
prior to the annual report submitted on June 1, 2004, and on June 1, 2005, and the 
periods afterwards until September 30 of each such year, the Secretary of State 
may disregard the presumption contained in the preceding sentence if the 
government has provided some data to the Department of State regarding such 
acts and the Secretary has determined that the government is making a good faith 
effort to collect such data. 
8. Whether the percentage of victims of severe forms of trafficking in the country 
that are non-citizens of such countries is insignificant. 
9. Whether the government of the country, consistent with the capacity of such 
government, systematically monitors its efforts to satisfy the criteria described in 
paragraphs (1) through (8) and makes available publicly a periodic assessment of 
such efforts. 
10. Whether the government of the country achieves appreciable progress in 
eliminating severe forms of trafficking when compared to the assessment in the 
previous year.” (TIP 2006)  
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Appendix D: Cases 
Africa Asia
Central 
America
Eastern 
Europe
South 
America
Saharan 
Africa
Western 
Europe
Egypt Azerbaijan Belize Belarus Argentina Angola Austria
Morocco Bangladesh Costa Rica
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bolivia Chad Denmark
Sudan Japan El Salvador Bulgaria Brazil
Congo, Dem. 
Republic France
Tunisia Kazakstan Guatemala Croatia Chile
Equatorial 
Guinea Italy
Kyrgyzstan Honduras Estonia Columbia Madagascar Norway
Lebanon Mexico Lithuania Ecuador Mali Portugal
Mongolia Nicaragua Macedonia Paraguay Mauritius Spain
Philippines Panama Poland Peru Mozambique
South Korea Romania Uruguay Niger
Syria
Serbia and 
Montenegro   Rwanda
Turkey Slovakia Senegal
Slovenia South Africa
Ukraine Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Cases by Region
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Appendix E: Variable Distribution 
Code # of Countries
6 11
5 13
4 29
3 2
2 9
1 3
Table 5 - Compliance Breakdown
          
Code
Number of 
Countries
9 to 10 1
8 to 9 2
7 to 8 4
6 to 7 3
5 to 6 3
4 to 5 9
3 to 4 16
2 to 3 25
1 to 2 4
Table 6 - Corruption Breakdown
 
 
 
 
 
Code
Number of 
Countries
3 34
2 22
1 11
Table 7 - Legitimacy Breakdown
        
Code
Number of 
Countries
0 - 4.9 27
5 - 9.9 17
10 - 14.9 9
15 - 19.9 3
20 - 24.9 2
25 - 29.9 3
30 - 34.9 3
35 - 39.9 0
40 - 44.9 1
45 - 49.9 0
50 - 54.9 1
Table 8 - GDP Breakdown
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Code
Number of 
Countries
0 - 4.9 9
5 - 9.9 21
10 - 14.9 13
15 - 19.9 6
20 - 24.9 1
25 - 29.9 2
30 - 34.9 1
35 - 39.9 1
40 - 44.9 0
45 - 49.9 2
Table 9 - Unemployment Breakdown
        
Code
Number of 
Countries
0 - 4.9 3
5 - 9.9 9
10 - 14.9 9
15 - 19.9 7
20 - 24.9 2
25 - 29.9 5
30 - 34.9 2
35 - 39.9 3
40 - 44.9 3
45 - 49.9 4
50 - 54.9 2
55 - 59.9 0
60 - 64.9 2
65 - 69.9 0
70 - 74.9 2
75 - 79.9 1
80 - 84.9 1
Table 10 - Poverty Line Breakdown
 
 
 
Code
Number of 
Countries
0.900 - 1.000 1
0.800 - 0.899 0
0.700 - 0.799 2
0.600 - 0.699 7
0.500 - 0.599 14
0.400 - 0.499 8
0.300 - 0.399 2
0.200 - 0.299 3
0.100 - 0.199 0
0.000 - 0.099 0
Table 11 - GEM breakdown
        
Code
Number of 
Countries
5 - 9.9 1
10 - 14.9 1
15 - 19.9 2
20 - 24.9 0
25 - 29.9 1
30 - 34.9 2
35 - 39.9 4
40 - 44.9 6
45 - 49.9 3
50 - 54.9 2
55 - 59.9 1
60 - 64.9 3
65 - 69.9 2
70 - 74.9 2
75 - 79.9 2
80 - 84.9 1
85 - 89.9 1
Table 12 - Sex. Freedom Breakdown
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Code
Number of 
Countries
15 - 19.9 3
20 - 24.9 1
25 - 29.9 9
30 - 34.9 9
35 - 39.9 6
Table 13 - Value Girls Breakdown
        
Code
Number of 
Countries
40 - 44.9 5
45 - 49.9 2
50 - 54.9 2
55 - 59.9 6
60 - 64.9 3
65 - 69.9 8
70 - 74.9 6
75 - 79.9 1
80 - 84.9 2
85 - 89.9 1
90 - 94.9 2
95 - 100 1
Table 14 - Prostitution Breakdown
  
 
